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Abstract 
 
The literature on open-access rail competition has been quite unanimous in pointing out the positive effects of the entry 
of the (few) newcomers in their respective markets. Generally speaking, quality has increased and frequency too. The 
effect on prices has also generally been what everybody expected: the newcomer is pricing less than the incumbent and 
overall the prices on the liberalised market are lower than the counterfactual ones. 
Without denying all the positive effects that rail competition in Italy has brought since 2012, thanks to the large-scale 
direct competition of NTV/Italo vs. the incumbent Trenitalia, in this paper we will provide the first evidence of something 
new, happened in the last 12 months. Since 2018, in fact, while frequencies and passengers continue to grow, for the first 
time also the average prices started increasing, even in those routes just opened to competition. 
The scope of this work is limited to analyse everyday train prices in a period of three years on numerous Italian routes, 
showing how prices changed over time and in particular according to the presence of competition and route characteristics. 
Findings are interesting: prices do not fall in all routes where competition starts, or at least just for a short period. In 
general, 2019 saw a consistent realignment of prices to a higher level than 2017-2018, for both competitors. One obvious 
explanation could be that the competitors are just apparently competing, or that production costs have raised (or both). 
This would be by far the worst outcome of a liberalisation process: costs up and cartel prices up with the costs. But the 
same phenomenon could be explained differently if there is no overcapacity: competition is working on parameters 
different than average prices (quality, frequency, product differentiation, price discrimination). We are still not able to 
demonstrate the existence of a cartel, so this work is just intended to show what has happened, and not why. 
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1. Introduction 
Literature on open-access rail competition has been quite unanimous in pointing out the positive 
effects of the entry of the (few) newcomers in their respective markets. Generally speaking, quality 
has increased and frequency too. The effect on prices has also generally been what everybody 
expected: the newcomer is pricing less than the incumbent and overall the prices on the liberalised 
market are lower than the counterfactual ones. In the literature review section we will document more 
precisely these findings, but not many surprises have happened until now. 
In this work we will provide new quantitative evidences about the well-known case of Italy, where 
Trenitalia – the national incumbent – and the newcomer NTV/Italo are competing in high-speed since 
2012. Without denying all the positive effects that rail competition has brought, in this paper we will 
provide the first evidence of something new, happened in the last 12 months: frequencies and 
passengers continue to grow, but for the first time also the average prices started increasing, even in 
those routes just opened to competition. In other words, we find evidences that the competition – or 
at least competition in some specific markets – is not necessarily pushing down prices.  
In this work we will limit to analyse everyday train prices in a period of three years on numerous 
Italian routes, showing how prices changed over time and in particular according to the presence of 
competition and route characteristics. Findings are interesting: prices do not fall in all routes where 
competition starts, or at least just for a short period. In general, 2019 saw a consistent realignment of 
prices to a higher level than 2017-2018, for both competitors. One obvious explanation could be that 
the competitors are just apparently competing, or that production costs have raised (or both). This 
would be by far the worst outcome of a liberalisation process: costs up and cartel prices up with the 
costs. But the same phenomenon could be explained differently if there is no overcapacity: 
competition is working on parameters different than average prices (quality, frequency, product 
differentiation, price discrimination). We are still not able to demonstrate the existence of a cartel, so 
this work is just intended to show what has happened, and not why. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 shortly introduces the case of Italian rail market, mainly 
referring to published works. Section 3 describes the dataset of rail prices used in the paper and 
Section 4 provides the results, city-pair by city-pair. Section 5 concludes, trying to find patterns and 
explanations to Section 4’s findings. 
2. Italian rail market, in brief 
Italy represented until now an unicum in the World, being the only country with direct on-track 
competition in high-speed rail services.1 Therefore it is just partially comparable to the well-known 
cases of Czech Republic and neighbours (Tomeš and Jandová, 2018), Sweden and Austria and 
moreover with the recent case of Flixtrain in Germany. Direct competition is however not the only 
relevant fact in introducing Italian long-distance rail market, as already described in Beria and 
Bertolin (2019), Beria et al (2018a and 2018b). 
The most relevant facts can be summarised in: 
a. A peculiar urban geography, with many large and small cities aligned along a limited number of 
corridors, differently from Spain or France, but also from the network of cities of Germany. 
b. A reasonably well-performing rail network, with some severe saturation problems on some lines, 
but not on the main corridors Turin-Naples2 (thanks to the HS doubling built mainly between 
1990 and 2010) or Turin-Venice. Nodes remain instead a problem (today mostly Milan and 
Florence). 
c. A lively coach sector connecting almost every city and a forever-dying national airline (Alitalia) 
that opened the doors to the low-cost carriers also on domestic routes, mostly Ryanair and 
easyJet. 
d. An increasing specialisation of rail services by NTV/Italo and Trenitalia, accompanied by an 
excellent quality (on board services, new rolling stock, etc.). 
e. An incredible level of frequency on main long-distance routes, reaching even 5 minutes of 
headway during peak-hours (Milan – Rome pair is connected 175 times per day in 2020). 
f. A relatively scarce integration (especially with respect to best cases of Germany or France) 
between regional and long-distance trains. 
The effects of competition between the two companies are important and well-studied. In addition 
to the already mentioned aspects of high-frequency and specialisation, fares are one of the main levers 
of competition between the two and between train and other modes. Early studies find a 30-40% 
decrease in prices with respect to former Trenitalia prices (see Table 1) in the very first years of entry. 
Later works looking at a market more in equilibrium find lower reductions. For example, Beria et al 
(2019) compares routes with and without competition, finding that NTV/Italo is usually 10% to 20% 
cheaper than Trenitalia, but that Trenitalia prices are not significantly different among routes with 
and without the competitor. The impression is therefore that a step down in Trenitalia prices occurred 
before 2013, but that later yields remain substantially similar. 
                                                 
1
 Competition in HS is also expected to start in the coming years in Spain and France. 
2
 Actually, the success of HS has dramatically increased the traffic also on new lines which are now near to capacity, 
even if no double-composition trains are used yet. The main saturation problems remain on the Florence-Rome, the oldest 
section and used also by some fast regional trains. 
 source observed price reduction period notes 
Cascetta & Coppola (2015) -34%  between 2011 and 2013 Overall fares reduction 
Cascetta & Coppola (2017) -31%  between 2009 and 2012 Overall fares reduction 
Giuricin (2018) -40% Period not specified  
NTV (2019) -30% and -43%  2011-2012 and 2011-2018 Overall yield reduction 
Beria et al. (2016) -15% (observed prices) between 2013 and 2014 Milano-Ancona route 
Table 1. Impact of competition on prices in Italy according to the early studies. 
In this study we will try to provide further evidence on that, looking both at situations where 
NTV/Italo is not present and at routes where NTV/Italo has entered during the period of observation. 
3. The dataset 
The paper is based on a large dataset of observations collected directly from booking websites, 
including all rail prices (classes, levels) on a selection of OD pairs representing relevant situations in 
Italian domestic market. The database has already been used in Beria et al. (2019), mainly as a cross-
section sample, while here we exploit, for the first time, also its time-dimension. 
3.1 OD pairs analysed 
We monitored 30 origin-destination pairs, chosen to be representative from the geographical and 
supply-level points of view. The pairs, in fact, are among the most important of the country in terms 
of patronage and range from North to South. They belong to routes differently served by alternative 
modes (air and coach), and with different level of competition. They also include short, medium and 
long pairs, as it has been clearly demonstrated the distance-dependency of unit prices applied in Italy 
(Beria et al., 2019). 
 OD pairs considered are described in Table 2 (supply) and Table 3 (distance and travel time). 
 
Table 2. Supply levels of the OD pairs analysed (long-distance only) 
OD pair Average Rail supply* 
[trains/day per direction] 
Air supply** Coach supply** 
 Trenitalia Of which PSO NTV [flights per day] [coaches per day] 
Bari - Ancona 15 5 - - 3 
Bologna - Ancona 20 6 - - 7 
Bologna - Bolzano 6 0 - - 5 
Bologna - Firenze 43 1 20 - 27 
Bologna - Trieste 3 2 - - 4 
Bologna - Venezia 20 0 8 - 11 
Milano - Pisa 6 5 - - 2 
Milano - Ancona 13 2 - - 9 
Milano - Bologna 41 5 10 - 26 
Milano - Brescia 26 0 - - - 
Milano - Firenze 19 1 10 - 18 
Milano - Genova 12 11 - - 6 
Milano - Napoli 28 2 15 14 5 
Milano - Rimini 13 2 - - 5 
Milano - Roma 39 0 17 34 19 
Milano - Torino 20 0 12 - 22 
Milano - Udine 2 0 - 2 3 
Milano - Venezia 26 0 - - 10 
Roma - Bari 4 1 - 7 14 
Roma - Bologna 57 2 20 4 18 
Roma - Ferrara 5 2 2 4 2 
Roma - Firenze 40 0 20 - 29 
Roma - Genova 9 2 - 6 10 
Roma - Reggio C. 7 4 - 6 5 
Roma - Torino 13 0 12 9 7 
Roma - Venezia 21 2 8 6 4 
Roma - Verona 8 0 4 4 6 
Torino - Brescia 10 0 - - 2 
Torino - Venezia 10 0 - 1 3 
Venezia - Firenze 18 2 8 - 6 
*   Average number of train/day per direction based on the current offer in a sample of days in 2017. 
** Number of flight or coach/day per direction based on the supply of Wednesday, 31st of October 2018. 
 
Table 3. Distance and travel time and for OD pairs analysed* 
OD pair Distance [km] Rail Air Coach 
  HS trains Conventional   
Bari - Ancona 442 3h40' 4h10' - 6h30’-7h30’ 
Bologna - Ancona 218 1h50' 2h0' - 3h00’-3h30’ 
Bologna - Bolzano 261 2h30' 2h40' - 4h00’ 
Bologna - Firenze 95 0h40' 1h10' - 1h15’-1h30’ 
Bologna - Trieste 296 3h0' 3h50' - 5h30’ 
Bologna - Venezia 151 1h10' 1h30' - 2h00’-2h30’ 
Milano - Pisa 301 - 4h10' - 4h30’-5h15’ 
Milano - Ancona 429 3h0' 4h10' - 5h30’-6h15’ 
Milano - Bologna 213 1h10' 2h20' - 3h00’-3h30’ 
Milano - Brescia 83 0h40' 0h50' - - 
Milano - Firenze 306 1h50' 3h50' - 4h00’-5h30’ 
Milano - Genova 140 1h30' 1h40' - 2h00’-2h30’ 
Milano - Napoli 790 4h30' 8h50' 1h20’ 10h00’-13h00’ 
Milano - Rimini 330 2h10' 3h20' - 4h45’-5h15’ 
Milano - Roma 567 3h10' 6h50' 1h10’ 8h00’-10h30’ 
Milano - Torino 143 0h50' 1h30' - 2h00’-2h30’ 
Milano - Udine 365 4h0' 4h0' 0h55’ 5h30’ 
Milano - Venezia 258 2h10' 2h20' - 3h30’-4h00’ 
Roma - Bari 498 4h0' 6h20' 1h05’ 5h30’-6h30’ 
Roma - Bologna 356 2h10' 4h10' 0h55’ 5h00’-6h00’ 
Roma - Ferrara 400 2h40' 4h40' 0h55’ 5h00’-5h30’ 
Roma - Firenze 261 1h30' 2h50' - 3h30’-4h00’ 
Roma - Genova 494 4h0' 5h0' 1h 10’ 6h30’-8h30’ 
Roma - Reggio C. 663 4h50' 7h10' 1h 10’ 9h00’-10h00’ 
Roma - Torino 711 4h10' - 1h 15’ 10h00’-10h30’ 
Roma - Venezia 504 3h30' 5h40' 1h 05’ 6h30’-7h00’ 
Roma - Verona 507 3h0' - 1h 00’ 7h00’-7h30’ 
Torino - Brescia 226 1h40' 2h30' - 3h15’ 
Torino - Venezia 401 3h10' 4h10' 1h 25’ 6h00’-6h30’ 
Venezia - Firenze 243 1h50’ - - 3h30’-4h00’ 
* Travel time values based on our database for trains and commercial offers in October 2018 for air and coach 
 
3.2 Dataset description 
Our dataset includes data collected for more than three years, from June 2016 to October 2019, with 
an average sample of 15 days of survey per month, both in weekdays and weekends.3 We observed 
all fares available for each train running on the chosen routes. We simulated five anticipated booking: 
1, 2, 5, 10 and 20 days before the date of travel. A “fully-booked combination” occurs when a specific 
ticket combination (flexibility and level of service) is sold out. A “fully-booked train” occurs when 
no seats are available, whatever is the class4. We mainly look at the lowest available fare, that could 
even be a fully-flexible first class seat if the rest of seats are unavailable. For this reason, it can be 
that in some periods the average price is above the typical 2nd class ticket. 
We collected prices only for long-distance trains and ignored regional trains. Their price is fixed and 
regulated by regional public service contracts. To the contrary, national PSO trains are included and 
surveyed, as their price is capped, but not fixed and promotional fares are commonly used exactly as 
in the market segment. To sum up, the categories of trains surveyed are classified as in Table 4. 
 
                                                 
3
 It must be noticed that some periods are missing, for example -1 days for NTV/Italo during Christmas 2016 and 2017. 
4
 With the exception of the highest level of service (“Executive”) for both operators. 
Table 4. Train category and type of service   
Train category Operator Type of service Regulation  Label used 
Italo Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatori High-speed Market NTV 
Frecciarossa Trenitalia High-speed Market TI_MK 
Frecciargento Trenitalia High-speed Market TI_MK 
Frecciabianca Trenitalia Conventional Market TI_MK 
Intercity Trenitalia Conventional PSO TI_IC 
Eurocity Trenitalia (or partner operator) Conventional PSO Excluded 
 
Each observation is the combination of: 
 Train (e.g. Train 8971 from Milan to Venice); 
 Company; 
 Day of travel; 
 Category of train; 
 Days of advance booking (1, 2, 5, 10 or 20 days); 
 Departure and arrival time; 
 Fare name and level of service; 
 Price per fare and level of service (upon availability). 
Through this data, considering the route length, we calculate also the average price per kilometer 
(€/km) for the 30 routes surveyed, in several different conditions of advance booking and type of fare. 
4. City-pairs evidences 
4.1 Pairs already in competition 
A first set of routes is made of those where competition was already ongoing, because NTV/Italo 
was present since before the start of our observations. The Milan-Rome is by far the most important, 
but others have significant traffic, too. On these pairs, as literature showed, prices have reduced in 
the past but the dynamics remain interesting, for reasons that will be commented in a while. 
 
Figure 1. Map of analysed routes (already in competition) 
In most pairs we will comment referring to four periods in the observations:  
1. Until the end of 2016 summer 
2. September 2016 – July 2018 
3. August 2018 – approx. Easter 2019 
4. Easter 2019 onwards. 
Starting from the Milan – Rome one day before departure, we can notice that the second period of 
the series shows the lowest prices, with Trenitalia slightly above 80 € and Italo around 65 € but with 
large variability day by day. After Summer 2018 prices rise significantly, especially for Italo/NTV 
and the average route price levitate to 85/90€, which is very near to the base flexible fare. This means 
that no more discounted fares are available before departure (and sometimes even higher than the 
base flexible price) and/or that trains are almost full. Looking at the 20 days before departure prices, 
the fares are much more variable (as low as 20 € for Italo/NTV and 40 € for Trenitalia, with an average 
route price floating around 50 € (but near to 60 € in the fourth period).  
Very visible, especially in the -20 days series, are some specific periods of holiday, when trains are 
usually full (in addition to touristic trips, all out-of-home workers tend to return home): Easter and 
Christmas, especially. Summer periods, for this pair, are not particularly peaking: the Milan – Rome 
is not a specifically touristic route and it is used at full capacity on working periods, differently from 
other pairs (e.g. Milan – Pisa, see later). 
 
  
Figure 2. Average daily minimum price (shown) on the Milan - Rome route. Days to departure: -1 
  
Figure 3. Average daily minimum price (shown) on the Milan - Rome route. Days to departure: -20 
A second route of the group is the Bologna-Florence. It is the shortest HS pair, but also the most 
crowded (in terms of demand and trains) due to the fact that it belongs to any O-D pair of the network 
going from North to South (i.e. not only From Turin/Milan, but also from Verona/Venice).  
The price trend of the route is similar to the Milan-Rome. Here the distinction between 1st and 2nd 
periods is less visible, while 3rd and 4th remain clearly above those of the first part of 2018. Concerning 
the 20 days to departure prices, the variability is much lower than Milan-Rome and prices range 
between 15 and 20 €, except for some very visible peaks (see for example Easter 2019). 
Interestingly, while on the Milan – Rome Italo/NTV prices have always been below Trenitalia ones, 
on this route we have an example of Italo/NTV pricing more than the competitor until April 2018 (-
20 days to departure). This is a first evidence of a discontinuity of Italo/NTV price strategy that will 
be found also elsewhere. 
In this OD pair there is another price level that is PSO intercity. They are not present in the Milan – 
Rome. Numerically, these trains are not many, around one per hour, and much slower. But the 
shortness of Bologna – Florence pair makes them relatively interesting as if they were a regional train 
(which actually do not exist anymore between the two cities). Despite Trenitalia can apply dynamic 
prices (and does it), in this route prices are almost fixed, around 12 € before departure and 10 € 20 
days earlier (slightly increased in the 3rd and 4th periods). Most likely Trenitalia is not willing to sell 
seats too cheap (cheaper than a regional fare) taking passengers out from HS services and occupying 
seats in the middle of the long O-D pairs these trains are intended to serve to (e.g Trieste – Naples). 
  
  
Figure 4. Average daily minimum price (shown) on the Bologna – Florence route. Days to departure: -1 
   
Figure 5. Average daily minimum price (shown) on the Bologna – Florence route. Days to departure: -20 
A third route is the Milan – Bologna. It is quite short (213 km), characterized by a lot of traffic, 
premium passengers (business trips) and also by long-distance commuters using discounted carnets 
of tickets (no data available, however). 
1 day to departure, we can notice again the same four periods described for the Milan – Rome. 
Italo/NTV, for example, sold last-day tickets at nearly 40 € initially, then felt to 35 € or less and then 
up again recently to 40 to 45 €. Very seldom prices are below 30 €, which means that the price per 
km is about 50% higher here with respect to Milan – Rome. While Trenitalia last day prices are quite 
constant and Italo/NTV well below it, the latter is able to reach Trenitalia levels in specific periods 
(for example Easter 2019, with Italo/NTV even higher than Trenitalia). 
The 20 days to departure prices are quite different: the three services (including PSO intercity) are 
almost overlapped (ranging from 20 to 30 €) and they are also very high (is seldom possible to 
purchase a ticket for less than 20 €). Similarly to what happened for the Bologna – Florence, we see 
again that Italo/NTV in 2016-2017 had discounted prices above Trenitalia ones, which probably 
explains the worse performances of the newcomer with respect to the incumbent. 
  
Figure 6. Average daily minimum price (shown) on the Milan – Bologna route. Days to departure: -1 
   
Figure 7. Average daily minimum price (shown) on the Milan – Bologna route. Days to departure -20. 
A last OD pair with early competition is the Rome – Verona route. Initially, the frequency was much 
lower than on the main route, but it improved rapidly and Trenitalia is now offering 1 train/h during 
peaks and Italo/NTV 5 frequencies per average day. 
Again, the 4 periods are recognizable. Trenitalia had much cheaper prices (falling from 80 to 60-
70€) between September 2016 and Summer 2018, when Italo/NTV increased the services. But now 
prices are up again to 80 € or more and Italo/NTV’s are not that far (70-80€). In other words, suddenly 
(Autumn 2018) both players rose prices, Trenitalia in one step and Italo/NTV in two steps (Autumn 
2018 and Spring 2019). 
Similarly to what happened in other routes, the 20-days to departure route is more unstable (high 
prices during public holidays, lower elsewhere). Italo/NTV is below Trenitalia also during peaks. 
Interestingly, sometimes the Intercity PSO trains are even more expensive than HS ones. This is 
because they are used by other passenger, i.e. those going south of Rome, which purchase tickets 
much more in advance. See for example prices before Christmas 2018. 
 
  
Figure 8. Average daily minimum price (shown) on the Rome  – Verona route. Days to departure -1. 
  
Figure 9. Average daily minimum price (shown) on the Rome  – Verona route. Days to departure -20 
4.2 Pairs where competition started during observations 
These routes are the most interesting of the sample, as we can see what happens when Italo/NTV 
enters in a market previously monopolistic. In a simpler situation, we would surely expect a fall in 
prices: the monopolist is pricing high and the newcomer is at least temporarily exploiting its price 
advantage to gain passengers. But with respect to a stylised situation, here we have that: 
a. Italo/NTV is a newcomer on that route, but already “known” by the monopolist on other routes 
b. The incumbent is already using extensively price-discrimination techniques 
c. In some cases there could be an initial situation of undercapacity (Milan – Venice, for example, 
is a very crowded route) 
d. In some cases the beginning of competition matches with the opening of the HS line (e.g. Milan 
– Brescia), which therefore means higher performances and higher willingness to pay of users. 
e. Competition could rise total costs, especially for thin routes. 
 
 
Figure 10. Map of analysed routes (competition started during observations) 
The Milan – Venice and Milan – Brescia routes (sharing the long-distance demand, but with the 
90km long Brescia – Milan one having also commuters) show similar trends. Before competition, 
Trenitalia was steadily pricing around 40 € (Venice) and 20-25 € (Brescia) before departure and 10 € 
less on both routes 20 days before. After the entry of NTV/Italo we can observe on Milan – Venice a 
small decrease of prices 20 days in advance. But in general, in no case after the entry average prices 
were reduced. In particular, NTV/Italo entered below the average price and Trenitalia increased it 
correspondingly. In the last period, both further raised prices making the average pair price higher 
than any previous period. This is particularly visible in the Milan – Venice, with prices after April 
2019 as high as 50€ while historically were 40€. 
 Figure 11. Average daily minimum price (shown) on the Milan  – Venice route. Days to departure -1 
 
Figure 12. Average daily minimum price (shown) on the Milan  – Venice route. Days to departure -20 
 Figure 13. Average daily minimum price (shown) on the Milan  – Brescia route. Days to departure -1 
 
Figure 14. Average daily minimum price (shown) on the Milan  – Brescia route. Days to departure -20 
A third interesting pair is the Rome – Ferrara. The service belongs to the Rome – Venice route, but 
NTV/Italo introduced the new stop of Ferrara since August 2018 and progressively increased the 
service until now, making the pair the only one of the sample where NTV/Italo has more services per 
day than Trenitalia (12/13 vs. 6). On the pair, a subsidised slow Intercity also exists. 
The dynamics of prices is somehow similar to the previous ones and can be summarised into: we 
see no price decrease due to entry, but at least the -20 days prices did not increase. The higher 
frequency of NTV/Italo is counterbalancing the lower brand power: the two competitors have now 
analogous prices, differently from the other mentioned cases. 
 
Figure 15. Average daily minimum price (shown) on the Rome – Ferrara route. Days to departure -1 
 Figure 16. Average daily minimum price (shown) on the Rome – Ferrara route. Days to departure -20 
 
 
4.3 Pairs with no competition 
In the sample we analysed also routes where NTV/Italo is not present. It is important to mention that 
today these monopoly routes are basically all on the conventional network or use the HS segments 
very limitedly (e.g. few Milan – Bari trains for the first 200 km). The following pictures show the 
average Trenitalia price for all of them (market services only). 
 
Figure 17. Map of analysed routes (routes without competition) 
 Without entering too much into detail, we see no clear difference from the previous routes. In 
particular, there is no visible price increase after Summer 2018 as observed above (rather a slight 
increase one day before departure). 
 
Figure 18. Average prices of Trenitalia monopolistic routes group 2. Days to departure -1. 
 Figure 19. Average prices of Trenitalia monopolistic routes group 2. Days to departure -20. 
 
We analyse just three cases. The Milan – Pisa one is a line characterised by high touristic flows but 
with a service almost totally under PSO. The Rome – Reggio Calabria is a 600 km pair with 8 PSO 
and 8 market services operated on a line out of the HS network, but with good speed performances. 
The Milan – Genova is a short but very crowded relation, with 22 PSO trains and 2 to 4 market trains. 
The prices on the Milan – Pisa are basically the same for the market and PSO services (also 
performances are similar: market ones are a bit faster but less frequent). Series are very steady one 
day before departure, while -20 days we can appreciate the peaks during school holidays (but 
especially those of the weekends, blurred by the period average but visible among dots). Day by day 
prices are instead extremely variable due to the weekend tourism. The line is one of the few with 
market prices in 2018-2019 lower than before 2018, but well offset by PSO trains, showing the lack 
of success of the not-so-faster market services. 
 
 Figure 20. Average daily minimum price (shown) on the Milan - Pisa route. Days to departure -1 
 
Figure 21. Average daily minimum price (shown) on the Milan - Pisa route. Days to departure -20 
The Rome – Reggio Calabria shows a visible difference between PSO intercity (slow service s with 
many stops) and the faster market services. One day before departure PSO trains are almost always 
at full fare (60€), while 20 days before some discounts still exist and prices can fall even to 30€ or 
even 10€. Market prices are about 20€ above this level, with more price variability and well visible 
school holidays peaks. 
 
 
Figure 22. Average daily minimum price (shown) on the Rome – Reggio Calabria route. Days to departure -1 
 Figure 23. Average daily minimum price (shown) on the Rome – Reggio Calabria route. Days to departure -20 
Finally, the Milan – Genova pair has an almost constant price for the numerous PSO trains one day 
before departure. This means that on no train any discounted ticket is available and all ticket reach 
the maximum cap fare. Interestingly, in the last months on some days the average is above the level 
recognisable as cap. The -20 days series are more variable, but prices are, once again, often near to 
the 20€ level, which is the cap price. Looking at market trains, one day before the situation is similar 
to the PSO: all trains are full and prices are around 27€. 20 days before the prices are instead even 
below the level of PSO trains, sign that these four connections are not particularly attractive for users 
(time savings to Genova is very limited and timetables are not necessarily the best ones). 
 Figure 24. Average daily minimum price (shown) on the Milano – Genova route. Days to departure -1 
 
Figure 25. Average daily minimum price (shown) on the Milano – Genova route. Days to departure -1 
5. Provisional conclusion 
5.1 An increasing price level 
Overall, we have shown that NTV/Italo is pricing below Trenitalia level of about 20%, with few 
exceptions. In the last period, NTV/Italo is pricing just 10% less (6% to 14% except for a couple of 
routes) one day before departure, suggesting better load factors. 
 
 
Figure 26. Difference in shown prices between Trenitalia (incumbent) and NTV/Italo (newcomer). 
 
But the relevant fact is not that NTV/Italo is cheaper, but that the entry of it on the panel of routes 
where we have prices before and after does not seem to decrease prices (both average and Trenitalia 
ones). What is even more interesting is that the average route market prices after Easter 2019 are 
systematically higher (and with a step) than the prices in the previous periods. Looking at both Figure 
27 and Figure 28 it is basically impossible to guess when NTV/Italo opened the route, as average 
route prices never fall (rather the opposite, for -1 days). Since after Italo entry prices of Trenitalia 
seem to rise, the effect for the customer is just a form of further price discrimination: low-WTP users 
move to NTV/Italo and Trenitalia gets the higher-WTP demand. 
From the analysis of this large dataset we can therefore affirm that there isn’t (anymore) an entry 
effect of NTV/Italo on prices, similarly to what has already been evidenced in Beria and Bertolin 
(2019) looking at average per km fare across different routes, but without comparing before/after 
periods.  
This is obviously not meaning that competition is not influencing prices, as there is no 
counterfactual: what would have happened if NTV/Italo were not present? Moreover, we cannot also 
affirm that the price reduction documented in early literature (-30% to -40%) has disappeared. But, 
for sure, the typical effect of an entry in a directly competitive market is not just lowering prices. So, 
the point to understand is why this is not happening. 
before Aug 
2016
Sept 2016 - 
Aug 2018
Aug 18 - Easter 
2019
Easter 2019 - 
Oct 2019
before Aug 
2016
Sept 2016 - 
Aug 2018
Aug 18 - Easter 
2019
Easter 2019 - 
Oct 2019
Milano - Bologna 7% 12% 10% 9% 5% 4% 9% 17%
Bologna - Firenze 8% 12% 20% 12% -19% -8% 11% 4%
Bologna - Venezia - 29% 30% 14% - 15% 23% 31%
Torino - Brescia - 32% 27% 15% - 47% 45% 35%
Torino - Venezia - 14% 17% 9% - 63% 44% 22%
Roma - Ferrara - 10% 18% 8% - 18% 11% 4%
Roma - Torino - 5% 14% 9% - 24% 19% 14%
Milano - Torino - 10% 20% 16% - 42% 44% 43%
Roma - Verona 24% 17% 17% 6% 21% 27% 30% 20%
Roma - Firenze 9% 12% 19% 9% -3% 7% 17% 16%
Roma - Venezia - -2% 13% 6% - 40% 23% 13%
Roma - Bologna 14% 17% 16% 10% 8% 11% 17% 16%
Venezia - Firenze - -4% 18% 11% - 35% 24% 20%
Milano - Brescia - 31% 27% 12% - 39% 37% 32%
Bologna - Bolzano - 9% 23% 23% - 0% 22% 21%
Bergamo - Bologna new route new route 25% 23% new route new route 27% 16%
Bergamo - Roma new route new route 13% 10% new route new route 21% 16%
Milano - Venezia - 24% 18% 10% - 58% 38% 26%
Milano - Firenze 12% 18% 15% 10% 12% 13% 16% 16%
Milano - Roma 10% 15% 12% 6% 20% 20% 23% 16%
Milano - Napoli - 4% 14% 6% - 27% 23% 19%
NTV prices vs. Trenitalia - 1 NTV prices vs. Trenitalia - 20
 Figure 27. Average daily minimum price (shown) on routes where NTV/Italo entered in the market. Days to departure -1 
 Figure 28. Average daily minimum price (shown) on routes where NTV/Italo entered in the market. Days to departure -20 
 
 
5.2 Shown prices are not revenues 
In Beria and Bertolin (2019) one possible explanation to the similar level of price on routes without 
competition was that Trenitalia was adopting the same pricing strategies and levels that would have 
adopted in presence of the competitor, even on routes where it was monopolist. This because the 
strategy proved to be effective for revenues or because preventing the entry of a possible newcomer. 
In parallel, it was also guessed that routes without NTV/Italo were mostly secondary routes: lower 
speed, lower competitiveness with plane/car, lower demand, lower demand and lower load factors. 
Unfortunately, the evidence of this paper is not going in the direction of confirming these 
hypotheses. Analysing the data not across routes, but looking at the time series we observed that 
Trenitalia is not lowering prices even when Italo enters. This is not a good indicator, even if not 
necessarily the sign of a cartel. Two possible alternative explanations: 
a) The entry of NTV rises total costs more than total revenues granted by new demand. Trenitalia 
has lower load factors and must increase prices to maintain the revenues. Actually it also “can” 
rise prices because demand is probably still willing to pay for the extra frequency and often NTV 
enters in the route when the line speed is increased (on the Torino-Venice entered when Milan-
Brescia HS line was opened). 
b) Shown prices are not perfectly correlated with revenues. Both companies are actively and 
massively using other yield management systems in addition to advanced purchase. NTV is 
issuing very often discount codes for newsletter subscribers applicable if booked during limited 
time-windows. Trenitalia has significant discounts for fidelity card owners (e.g. 11-14 Tuesday-
Thursday 50% or couples or elder and young). Both offer multi-rides carnets for commuters. So, 
the price dynamics we measure is not necessarily the dynamics of the revenues. 
Despite we have absolutely no access to detailed revenues data (for Trenitalia is even difficult to 
separate PSO and market revenues), an estimation of the average revenue per pax*km is shown in 
Figure 29. We can see that in 2018 per km revenues were not higher than in 2017; that 2010 market 
prices were higher than 2018; that Italo is about 20% below Trenitalia in terms of revenues (despite 
working on the core of the market, the HS); and that only PSOs increased. Unfortunately, data for 
2019 are not available, and we cannot confirm this last hypothesis that revenues increased with prices. 
 
Figure 29. Estimation of unit revenues of long-distance market segment. Source: our elaborations on NTV, Trenitalia and Ferrovie 
dello Stato balances.  
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